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We analyse whether there is a relationship between EU Commissioners’ national origin and
political outcomes. For this purpose, we argue that examining the Commissioner for Agricul-
ture allows the most precise empirical identification: there is a specific budget for agriculture
which accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget and gives significant leeway
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in the share of the overall EU budget that is allocated to their country of origin of about
one percentage point. This increase corresponds to half a billion Euro per year, a significant
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country-specific time trends, examining pre- and post-treatment trends and modeling en-
dogenous treatment-selection. There are no significant differences in trend behavior between
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
Article 17, Treaty on European Union (TEU):
“The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initia-
tives to that end. [...] In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely
independent. [...] [T]he members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions
from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity” (European Union, 2010).
1 Introduction
It is the aim of international or supranational organizations to move beyond national senti-
ments, and pursue the ‘common good’ of their respective principal constituents. However,
there is abundant anecdotal evidence documenting that nationality continues to play a role
in shaping actor’s decision-making in international organizations like the World Bank or the
IMF (Novosad & Werker, 2014). We systematically examine which role nationality plays in
the European Union (EU), a particularly interesting case of a supranational institution, where
conflicts of interests between the individual member states and the centralized organs of the
EU frequently become obvious.
For instance, the current EU Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Pierre Mosco-
vici, recently caused a massive controversy. Moscovici, a former national minister in France,
was one of the first to sign a request from the French Socialist Party for communitization of
national government debt on the European level. This contradicts the officially communicated
view that members of the EU Commission (EC) remain independent and detached from
member states’ domestic politics and supposedly only represent the “common interest” of
all member states.1 In this case, the official portfolio description for the Commissioner for
Economic and Financial Affairs states that he is responsible “for [e]nsuring enforcement of the
Stability and Growth Pact and reviewing its fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance legislation
[...] and budgetary rules”.2
Nonetheless, the EC as the main executive body of the EU is keen on maintaining a pic-
ture where it “represents the interests of the EU as a whole”,3 with Commissioners working
independently and unaffected by their cultural and national background. This claim of in-
dependence from their country of origin is also in stark contrast to the effort and intensity
with which member states seek attractive Commissioner posts for ’their’ Commissioner (cf.
description in Napel & Widgrén, 2008; Nugent, 2001). Moreover, there are repeated cases
where former Commissioners pick up important positions in their home country after their
term in Brussels. Vaubel et al. (2012) suggest that rational Commissioners should thus to
1 See: https://magazin.spiegel.de/digital/?utm_source=spon&utm_campaign=inhaltsverzeichnis#
SP/2015/19/134762470 (last accessed on May 15, 2015).
2 http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/moscovici_en (last accessed on May 16, 2015).
3 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_en.htm (last accessed on May 4, 2015).
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some degree take their future electorate and career prospects into account.
It is another question whether individual Commissioners actually possess the means to favor
their country of origin, and whether the available data provide enough statistical power to
detect such a relationship. We approach this issue by focusing our empirical analysis on those
Commissioners and budgets which, first, allow relatively direct traceability of the individual
Commissioner’s actions and, second, provide some leeway to shape the budget. Specifically,
we examine whether having the Commissioner for Agriculture is related to an increase in the
spending on agriculture for the respective country of origin.4
The EU Commissioner for Agriculture is an ideal candidate for several reasons. First, since its
inception, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been among the most important pillars
of the EU’s work and consumed a major share of the overall EU budget.5 Until the 1980s,
it represented more than 70% of the community’s overall budget, and currently accounts for
approximately 40%.6 A key component of the CAP is to support the agricultural sector
with a specifically created EU fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund (EAGGF). This allows us to clearly identify an economically significant fund which the
Commissioner can potentially influence. Second, the member states have viable interests in
these budget decisions due to their economic importance and political salience (cf. Schneider,
2013) and the Commissioners have significant power and leeway to influence the budgetary
process, for example in their role as agenda setters or due to information advantages. Thus,
if national background matters, we can plausibly expect to be able to identify its effects.7 By
fulfilling these two requirements, examining this relationship is likely to yield the most reliable
and least noisy estimate of the effect of Commissioner nationality on allocation decisions.
Our paper relates to different strands of literature. We add to the literature on the effect
of national or regional identity or ethnicity on political decisions and budgetary allocations.
Jennes & Persyn (2015) study how political representation can explain variations in the ge-
ographical distribution of social security and tax transfers in Belgium over the 1995-2000
period. They find that providing a minister leads to increased transfers to the respective
home region. Likewise, Dreher et al. (2015) investigate how leaders in Africa redirect Chinese
development aid towards their home region, using a newly developed database that coded
Chinese development finance projects across 3,545 physical locations in Africa over the 2000-
4 We also consider the Budget Commissioner’s relationship to the overall budget and the Commissioner for
Regional Policy’s relationship to the allocation of social and regional funds. All three are related to the
allocation of funds and could therefore use their leeway to re-channel resources to their home countries.
However, the Budget Commissioner’s influence on how and where money is exactly spent is relatively
limited; similarly the influence on the Social and Regional Funds is relatively hard to trace back to the
Regional Commissioner directly.
5 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm (last accessed on May 3, 2015).
6 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm (last accessed on April 16, 2015).
7 Farmers usually constitute a well organized lobby group (e.g., Olson, 1965), which can set incentives for
the respective national governments to lobby on their behalf or for the Commissioners to care about their
future support if they consider returning to national politics in the future.
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2012 period. In a similar vein, but with a worldwide focus, De Luca et al. (2015) use data
on the ethnic origin of political leaders for a panel of ethnographic regions in 138 countries
over the 1992-2012 period and indicate that leaders redistribute funds to their ethnic home
regions.
More specifically, we also relate to a large literature focused on European institutions and
EUpolitics (for an overview see, e.g., Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2012). Aksoy (2010) shows an
influence of voting power and agenda-setting on the allocation of the EU budget. Similarly, a
study of the EU cohesion fund over the 1989-1999 period by Bouvet & Dall’Erba (2010) also
indicates that factors like national and regional electoral margins also influence the allocation
process. Schneider (2013) finds that member states receive larger shares of the EU budget in
the years prior to domestic elections.
While earlier research on the EC had often approached the Commission as a whole, more
recent work has also examined the behavior of the individual actors who form the EC (see for
instance Smith, 2003; Wonka, 2007). We follow this more disaggregated approach and add to
the existing literature by studying the influence of the EU Commissioners for Agriculture on
the share of EU spending received by their home countries. Our results indicate a significant
positive relationship between the Commissioners’ country of origin and the agricultural fund
spending their home country receives during their terms in office. This relationship translates
into about 510 million EUR per year for the country of origin of the respective Commissioner.
To identify whether this relationship has a causal interpretation, it would help if the as-
signment of our treatment, the Agricultural Commissioner, is random. Certainly, the final
decision as to which country is assigned which Commissioner has a random component. While
the Heads of State or Government and the Commissioner candidates usually try to lobby the
designated President of the EC to assign them one of their preferred portfolios (see Nugent,
2001), it is the President who finally decides on the portfolio distribution.8 This complicated
bargaining process that has to take internal demands and political power into account in fact
often results in surprising outcomes.9
8 The position of the President of the EC in the appointment process was strengthened in the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Napel & Widgrén (2008) provides an in-depth description of the appointment procedure for
the EC President and the Commissioners.
9 Even until days before the final selection, it is unclear which member state will get which position. An
illustrative example of this is the appointment of the current German Commissioner Günther Oettinger in
2014. The German Government and Oettinger himself had expressed a preference to take responsibility of
the trade portfolio. Until a few days before the official announcement by the President of the EC, media
declared him to be – in all likelihood – the next Trade Commissioner. To general surprise, Oettinger was
appointed as Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, instead. See, for example, on the common ex-
pectations: German weekly Wirtschaftswoche (July 19, 2014) at http://www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/
eu-kommission-merkel-will-oettinger-als-handelskommissar/10219282.html and the Euractiv Eu-
ropean policy platform (August 29, 2014) at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/
oettinger-interested-eu-trade-commissioner-post-308060. For one of many examples of the
surprise after the final decision see Borderlex (September 10, 2014) at http://www.borderlex.eu/
trade-commissioner-malmstrom-appointment-comes-surprise/ (all last accessed on April 30, 2015).
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It is still possible that some states have little interest at all in agriculture, and thus have a
systematically lower likelihood of treatment. If some countries are just generally less likely
to provide the Commissioner, country fixed-effects should suffice in avoiding this selection
problem. In addition, our results remain robust when we exclude the largest member states
which have less interest in holding this particular position, as well as when excluding each
member state individually.
However, we do not solely rely on the random treatment assumption for our identification
strategy. A consistent estimate of the average treatment effect would be jeopardized by dif-
ferential trends between the treated and untreated member states. We use a setting similar to
Autor (2003), where we code leads and lags to show that there are no significant differences
in pre- and post-treatment trends. Moreover, even accounting for potentially different devel-
opments with country-specific time trends in addition to the country and year fixed-effects
does not affect our estimations. Modeling the selection process explicitly using an endoge-
nous binary-switching model leads to a larger negative coefficient, indicating that selection
was biasing against finding a significant relationship. Finally, we compute that selection-on-
unobservables would have to be between one and nearly five times as strong as selection-on-
observables to account for the positive relationship (cf. Altonji et al., 2005). If we require
that our estimation fulfills requirements suggested by those met by randomized studies, our
identified set of β-estimates does not include zero in any of the comparisons suggested by
Oster (2013).
The paper is structured as follows: Section two summarizes the relevant literature and shortly
explains the structure of the EU Commission with its members. Subsequently, it outlines
why examining the Commissioner for Agriculture and the directly related agricultural fund
provides a promising opportunity to assess the effect of nationality on budget allocation
decisions in the EU. In section three we describe the data and our empirical strategy. Section
four presents the main results and robustness checks, and section five concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 The Role of National Background in the European Union
Factors that determine money allocation in international politics have been the focus of polit-
ical economy research in recent years. Political power in international organizations is among
other things reflected in the distribution of money. Dreher et al. (2009a) and Kuziemko &
Werker (2006), for instance, find that temporary membership in the United Nations Security
Council increases the amount and extent of official development assistance a country receives
during its appointment. Other studies show the importance of political leaders for a nation’s
advancement in various dimensions. Franck & Rainer (2012) indicate that ethnicity of leaders
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in sub-Saharan countries is crucial for the development of favoritism in terms of education
and health expenditures. Dreher et al. (2009b) point out that the individual background of
political leaders affects the reforms they implement, and Olken & Jones (2005) find a great
influence of leaders on the economic performance of their country. Thus, it is evident that
the roles of individuals have to be taken into account when analyzing political and economic
processes.
The European Union is a particularly interesting object of study, and the development of
it’s role in European politics has been at the core of a considerable number of studies (e.g.,
Alesina et al., 2005). Previous research carves out different centers of power in the European
political game. However, the majority of empirical analysis focus on the Council of the
European Union (Council) as the essential legislative organ of the EU, where the member
states’ governments are represented.10 These studies (e.g., Aksoy, 2010; Carrubba, 1997;
Schneider, 2013) investigate the distribution of EU funds, suggesting that member states try
to increase their share of the allocated amounts.
Kauppi & Widgrén (2007; 2004) show that voting power in the Council (measured by the
Shapley-Shubik index) explains a significant share of the variation in the budget allocation.11
In a similar vein, Rodden (2002, p. 170) states that “empirical analysis demonstrates a close
connection between the distribution of votes and fiscal transfers in the legislative institutions
of the European Union.” Aksoy (2010) and Mazumder et al. (2013) present arguments and
empirical evidence how holding the rotating EU Council Presidency can be used to achieve
the respective country’s strategic interests. Carnegie et al. (2014) show that former colonies of
countries who hold the Council presidency obtain significantly more foreign aid. Furthermore,
Schneider (2013) finds that countries receive larger shares of the EU budget in years before
domestic elections. She explains her finding with an increase in the member states’ bargaining
powers resulting from the government’s need for successful negotiation results. Carrubba
(1997) points out that a country with weaker domestic EU support within the population
receives larger net transfers.
The Commissioners’ influence on the EU budget distribution has, to the best of our knowl-
edge, not been systematically examined in the existing literature. Yet, theoretical literature
indicates that Commissioners are potentially influential in every phase of the legislative pro-
cess (Bachtler & Mendez, 2007; Tömmel, 2014), even though the EC has no final right to
decide about EU policy directly as far as voting is concerned. Figure 1 depicts the structure
of EU decision-making and the central role of the EC in interaction with the parliament and
the national governments.
10 Together with the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, sometimes also referred to as
the Council of Ministers, forms the EU’s legislative. Depending on the policy area, the Council meets in
different compositions, because all member states dispatch their national ministers who are responsible for
the certain portfolio.
11 For explanations, performances, and discussion of different power indices, see Barr & Passarelli (2009).
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Figure 1: Simplified Structure of the EU
The main actors and the structure of decision-making in the European Union (own
illustration); compare e.g. Baldwin & Wyplosz (2012) and Tömmel (2014).
The European Commission is the main executive and administrative organ of the EU. Its
wide range of functions includes an exclusive right for policy initiation, implementation, and
monitoring, as well as control over EU programs, mediation between the member states’
governments, and external representation tasks (Egeberg, 2010). It is organized in a cabinet
structure and Commissioners are – comparable to national ministers – responsible for a certain
portfolio and in most cases related to one specific “Directorate General” in the Commission’s
administrative section.12 The appointment of the 27 Commissioners follows the principle: one
country, one Commissioner. However, it is the President of the EC who assigns the portfolios
to the Commissioner candidates, which often results in unexpected portfolio allocations (Nu-
gent, 2001). As outlined above, it is common that the specific choices remain unclear until the
day of the announcement, making the choice of one particular Commissioner close to random.
One can observe that, in contrast to past terms, member states nowadays increasingly delegate
high ranked politicians (e.g., former national ministers) and members of the governing party
as Commissioners to Brussels (Egeberg, 2010; Döring, 2007). According to Wonka (2007),
67.4% of the Commissioners, chosen by the member states from 1958 to 2006, came from the
governing party and only 18.1% from the opposition. This suggests a principal-agent-structure
(Vaubel, 2006; Wonka, 2007), with governments selecting reliable actors who are expected
12 See also http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019_en (last accessed on May 4, 2015) for details on
the EC.
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to take national interests into account on the EU-level (Wonka, 2007). Although national
governments have weaker means of exerting pressure and controlling the EC’s decisions in
the post-nomination phase (Vaubel, 2006), career-prospects (e.g., getting a leading position
in national politics or elsewhere as a reward) and the option to be renominated for the
lucrative job are potential incentives to keep the country of origin’s policy preferences in mind
(Döring, 2007; Vaubel et al., 2012).13 In line with these arguments, Vaubel et al. (2012, p.59)
demonstrate how many Commissioners systematically plan their “life after the Commission”:
In their sample, they find that 36% change to the private sector or lobby groups and 43%
return to national politics.
This political self-interest and the fact that candidates for the position are chosen by the
national governments points towards potential conflicts of interest (Tömmel, 2014).14 On
the one hand, all Commissioners owe their position to a system of proportional national
representation and a proposal of ‘their’ national government, but, on the other hand, they are
supposed to act independently and in the “general interest” (TEU). This conflict of interest
casts doubts on initial studies in political science which often described the Commission as
a unitary technocratic actor, pursuing interests distinct from those of member states, and
supports authors like Wonka (2007), who more recently rejects this assumption. He deems it
rather unlikely that the delegates – who are assumed to act like politicians – will collectively
turn against the governments which once helped them to take office. Thomson (2008) supports
this notion by showing that Commissioners share the policy positions of the government of
their country of origin.
In fact, the nature of the EC has at all times raised the general suspicion of being an arena for
national interests. The Economist calls it “one of the better jokes in Brussels” that Commis-
sioners are “completely independent” of their home countries.15 This notion is backed by some
anecdotal evidence. In 2007 and 2008, for example, the German Commissioner for Enterprise
and Industry, Günter Verheugen, repeatedly opposed a Commission proposal to reduce new
car’s carbon dioxide emissions. This was widely perceived as support for the car industry,
one of Germany’s most important economic sectors. Due to the opposition of Verheugen,
the initial proposal by the Commissioner for Environment, Stavros Dimas, was weakened.
Afterward, Dimas admitted that Verheugen “won against him” in the negotiations.16
Another example illustrates that nominated candidates do consider the promotion of national
interests part of their task. Before taking office in 2014, Ve˘ra Jourová, the current Commis-
13 In the context of two German cities, Potrafke (2013) provides another example of the relationship between
voter preferences and public spending in a principal-agent structure.
14 In addition, current outside earnings could also create conflicts of interests, which we do not further consider
here as they are not systematically related to our research question. Focusing on members of the German
Bundestag, Arnold et al. (2014) find no clear relationship between outside earnings and parliamentary effort.
15 See The Economist, under http://www.economist.com/node/10171795 (last accessed on April 28, 2015).
16 See Deutschlandfunk for the translated direct quote under http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/
autolobby-contra-klimaschutz.724.de.html?dram:article_id=98703 (last accessed on April 28, 2015)
and EU Observer under https://euobserver.com/economic/25453 (last accessed on April 28, 2015).
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sioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, was asked about her aims as the new
Czech EU Commissioner. She said that “[t]he European Commissioner must of course be
impartial, without regard to national interests. Beyond this, however, I would like to focus
on coordinating the activities of Czech people in EU institutions to promote Czech national
interests – after my working hours, if you will.”17 These examples are in line with Egeberg
(2006, p. 13) who remarks that “Commissioners as well as cabinet ministers have their ‘local’
community back home which imposes certain expectations on them while in office.”
2.2 Identifying the Link Between Commissioners and Budget Items
Despite these studies and anecdotal evidence, it is not clear whether these examples con-
stitute exceptions or can be supported by empirical evidence. To be able to identify this
relationship, it is of particular interest to consider the role, room for maneuver, and power
of the Commissioners in the legislative process. The Commission’s most relevant power is its
monopolistic position as the agenda setter, characterized by an exclusive privilege to make
legislative, budgetary and program proposals in areas that fall under EU responsibility (Ar-
ticle 17, TEU). It can decide, on the whole, whether to take up policy propositions from
the European Parliament (EP) and the Council or not (Bachtler & Mendez, 2007; Egeberg,
2010): “The Council, the EP and member states may make suggestions to the Commission
and can call on the Commission to present new proposals, but it is the European Commission
that actually drafts proposals” (Roozendaal & Hosli, 2012, p. 449). As a consequence, the
Commission can exert influence by defining “the terms in which issues are discussed” (Hosli
& Thomson, 2006, p. 397).18
In the run-up to the introduction of a new policy proposal, the Commissioners try to anticipate
and consider possible supporting coalitions in the Council or EP. As “interface managers”
(Tömmel, 2014, p. 152), it is their task to mediate between the legislative organs and to find
compromises with majority appeal. According to Hosli & Thomson (2006), the Commissioners
are also continuously involved in discussions in the Council, and negotiations between the EP
and the European Council. In addition to organizing majorities in the Council or EP, they also
need to win the support of their colleagues in the Commission. Hence, it is common practice
to do “package deals” (Tömmel, 2014, p. 152) in order to gain enough support for one’s
proposal. Nevertheless, the intra-Commission decision-making process is a first control-level
that might limit the ability of individual Commissioners to pursue their own agendas.
17 For the direct quotation see Radio Praha under http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/
minister-vera-jourova-nominated-for-czech-eu-commissioner (last accessed on April 30, 2015), writ-
ten July 21, 2014.
18 Empirical evidence about the budgetary impact of such proposal powers is provided by Knight (2005). In-
vestigating the allocation of transportation projects in the U.S. in 1991 and 1998, he finds that congressional
districts which have a member on the transportation authorization committee and thus possess proposal
power, receive significantly more project spending than districts without a member on this committee.
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It seems plausible that Commissioners would use their informational advantages vis-à-vis the
EP and the member states’ representatives in the Council (Döring, 2007; Hosli & Thomson,
2006). These advantages are derived, for example, from the staff of their associated Directorate
General or because they consult with external experts and acquire information from interest
groups in an early stage of the legislative process. As a consequence, the Commission, which
takes part in Council meetings can try to forge political deals. Likewise, Commissioners
supposedly have informational advantages (albeit in a weaker form) in negotiations with
other Commissioners (Thomson, 2008), when decisions in their field of activities are made.
The decision-making process at these meetings and negotiations is opaque, however, and only
scarcely documented; thus not allowing a systematic analysis of the relation we are interested
in.
Figure 2: EU Budget Structure
Structure of EU Expenditures, percentages of the total. Source: European Commis-
sion, adapted from Butzen et al. (2006).
Instead, we focus on the EU Commissioner for Agriculture who is, among other things, directly
responsible for payments from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF). This fund is the main pillar of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and came
into force in 1962. Up until now, the agricultural fund has made up the greatest part of the
EU’s overall expenditures (cf. Figure 2). In spite of two substantial reforms of the CAP in
1992 and 2003 that gradually shifted the EU’s agricultural expenditure from guaranteeing
price support for agricultural products to individual direct payments for farms (decoupling)
and rural development programs (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2012; Fouilleux, 2010), the EAGGF
was allocated consistently annually until 2007.
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The CAP scheme is particularly well-suited to analyze the relationship between national
background and budget allocation. It has a re distributional nature and provides a classic
example of pork-barrel politics (Weingast et al., 1981), where each country supposedly aims
to acquire as many fund resources as possible. The CAP is a major and salient budgetary
item in the overall budget. Hence, it is plausible that member states are interested in trying
to make use of “their” Commissioner as their popularity with the electorate at home can
depend on the bargaining performance (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2012; Schneider, 2013).19
A precise description of the annual CAP budget negotiations, which take place a year ahead
of the actual budget year (cf. Aksoy, 2010) is provided by Fouilleux (2010, p. 344):
“CAP decision making usually begins with a proposal from the Commission [...]. The Agri-
cultural Council meets monthly, more frequently than most of the EU Councils. One of these
meetings was usually set aside to discuss what was called the ‘price package’ for the following
year, at which the member states decided on such issues as the level of guaranteed prices for
each product and the amount of quota by country” (Fouilleux, 2010, p. 344).20
Accordingly, the Agricultural Commissioner has multiple opportunities to influence budget
distribution that go beyond gaining leverage through the EC’s budget proposals. Negotiating
‘price packages’, their agenda setting position, and information advantages can be used to
redirect funds.
The requirements for reliable identification of a causal relationship that we formulated above
are only partly fulfilled by the Commissioner for the Budget and the Commissioner for Re-
gional Policy. Both are agenda setters in their respective realm, and responsible for EU funds.
Regional policy is closely related to two structural funds: the European Social Fund (ESF)
and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The allocation of these funds is to
a larger degree based on formal criteria, however, and the Regional Commissioner’s portfolio
cannot be separated from the portfolios of other Commissioners as clearly.21 Schneider (2013,
p. 466) explains that “since ERDF/ESF transfers are allocated on a project-level basis, states
are more restricted in their annual negotiations to move around already stipulated funds.”
The Budget Commissioner has the main responsibility for managing the budget negotiations
19 We do not discuss the general welfare implications of this controversial redistributive policy here. A similar
case of how origin matters in politics documented at the within-country level is Stratmann & Baur (2002).
In their analysis of the German Bundestag, they indicate that particularly first-past-the-post elected par-
liamentarians seize opportunities for pork-barreling in an attempt to satisfy “their” electorate. Whether
and why more market based approaches and less pork-barrel politics could lead to welfare improvements is
beyond the scope of this paper. Evidence that more reliance on market forces does not only lead to higher
growth rates but also relates to higher subjective well-being is, for example, presented by Gehring (2013).
20 Before the Lisbon-Treaty (2007), the European Parliament had little influence on budget decisions in the
field of CAP (see e.g. Crombez & Swinnen, 2011; Schneider, 2013).
21 For example, one criterion is that “to be eligible for most of the ERDF/ESF resources, the per capita GDP
of the country has to fall below 75 percent of the average GDP in the EU” (Schneider, 2013). For further
details on the funds and criteria of the ERDF and ESF fund see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/funding/erdf/ and http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1.
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with the member states.22 However, he has more of an influence on the allocation of budgets
towards the individual budget items than on the distribution across member states, a respon-
sibility which falls to the respective Commissioners or is decided by the whole Commission.
Moreover, there is only limited room to maneuver in the annual budget negotiations due to
the constraints set by the long term multi-annual financial frameworks of the EU.23 Hence,
we are convinced that examining the Commissioner for Agriculture provides the best option
to analyze the relationship between national background and Commissioners’ behavior. It
is a case where the Commissioners have the leeway to exert influence, which is of economic
significance, and where we can directly trace their decisions back to impacting a specific fund.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
In the following we describe our variables of interest, and give a brief description of the relevant
control variables which are derived from Schneider (2013). Since the EU has undergone several
enlargement rounds (cf. Figure 3), the length of time that is covered depends on the respective
country’s timing of joining the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are not included as their one year
of membership from 2005-2006 does not allow an estimation with country fixed-effects. We
thus analyze a non-balanced panel for a maximum of 25 countries.
As dependent variables, we are interested in the share of the EU budget that a particular
country i receives at time t. Our main variable and the focus of our paper is the share of
the EAGGF Budget that country i receives as a percentage of the total EU budget. The
budget shares are derived from Schneider (2013) and range from 1979 to 2006.24 More recent
information does not exist in a comprehensive way at the moment. We use the share to be able
to easily disentangle changes in the overall budget sizes from changes in relative allocation.
22 See the official homepage of the current Commissioner for official goals and responsibilities under http:
//ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/georgieva_en (last accessed on April 30, 2015).
23 The multi-annual financial frameworks of the EU act as a severe constraint and are negotiated by the heads
of governments for seven (previously five) years (Schneider, 2013). In the multiannual budget negotiations,
the member states “outline EU spending by setting ceilings on expenditures for each budget category
and on total expenditure” (Schneider, 2013, p. 465). Thus, relating annual budget data to the budget
Commissioner might not provide enough variation to find a significant relationship.
24 All budget data are taken from annual reports of the European Court of Auditors. The EAGGF
was replaced by two follow-up funds in 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm, last
accessed on April 16, 2015). This is the main reason that our sample ends in 2007. As one of
these funds, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) co-finances economic ru-
ral development programs of the member states (see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/
funding-opportunities/index_en.htm, last accessed on April 22, 2015), it is more difficult to directly
trace its changes back to actions of the Commissioner for Agriculture. It pursues goals similar to
those of the cohesion and regional funds and might thus be influenced by other Commissioners as
well. Specifically, it mostly “co-finances the rural development programs of the Member States” (see
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/funding-opportunities/index_en.htm, last accessed
on May 20, 2015).
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This way of measuring negotiation success is more robust when examining a total budget that
changed over the course of time (Aksoy, 2010; Butzen et al., 2006).25 In addition to our focus
on shares of the agricultural funds, we also test whether similar relationships exist for the
overall budget and the regional and social funds.
Figure 3: Dates of EU Accession
Own graphic based on data provided by the European Commission.
Our variable of interest is the nationality of the respective Commissioner. We use multiple
sources (see Appendix A) to gather the terms of the EU Commissioners for Agriculture over
our sample period. We code a variable Commissioner that contains the share of a year that
country i provides this Commissioner (measured by months in office). Appendix A shows
the respective appointment and resignation dates of all Commissioners during our sample
period. With few exceptions, Commissioner has the nature of a binary variable (being 1,
if the member state appoints the Commissioner in a certain year and 0 otherwise), because
Commissions were usually replaced in January. The average tenure of office is three years.
In addition, we also code variables Commissioner (B) and Commissioner (R) for the EU
Commissioner for the Budget and the Commissioner for Regional Policy respectively.
25 Within the scope of this paper, we disregard contractual amendments which altered the distribution of
power between the EU’s three main organs and changed the budgetary procedures. Crombez & Hix (2011)
for instance argue that under qualified majority voting, it should be easier for the Commission to push its
interest through by focusing on pivotal member states. The length of our sample, however, does not offer
enough statistical power to make valid estimations for sub-periods. See Crombez (2000), Hosli & Thomson
(2006), and Aksoy (2010) for consequences of the particular treaties, voting rules and the differences be-
tween ‘consultation’ and ‘co-decision’ procedure and Heinemann (2003) for an investigation of the political
economy of EU enlargement and treaty amendments.
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For reasons of transparency and to avoid any impression of data mining, we do not propose
our own set of control variables but rather adopt those in Schneider (2013). Her set of control
variables is based on EU distribution principles (see, e.g., Bouvet & Dall’Erba 2010) as well as
on previous findings in literature. AppendixB provides the exact definitions and data sources.
Election Year (Binary) and Pre-election Year (Binary) are binary variables that account for
the years before and during domestic elections. The data for Unemployment Rate, Per Capita
GDP (EU=100) (100 equals the EU average) and Employment Agriculture (ln) (measuring
the employment in agricultural sector as natural logarithm in millions) are from Eurostat.
The variable Domestic EU Support (%) measures the domestic support for the EU as a
whole. Data are from Eurobarometer. Bargaining power in the EU Council can be quantified
using the shapley-shubik index and is included in Voting Power Council (%).26 New Member
State (Binary) is a binary variable for all new members until the next enlargement round of
the EU, which is coded as 1 if a country is a new member in this period and 0 otherwise.
It accounts for the fact that new members, receive lower budget shares initially, because of
their inferior administrative capacity and bargaining experience to absorb the funds (Plümper
& Schneider, 2007; Schneider, 2013). Due to the enlargement rounds, the budget shares
that single member states receive decrease over time. The variable Number of EU Members
accounts for the enlargements by controlling for the number of member states. Desriptive
statistics are provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Agricultural Fund Share 383 3.89 3.90 0 17.49
Overall Funds Share 383 5.98 5.21 0.02 20.84
Regional/Social Funds Share 383 1.46 1.73 0 9.19
Commissioner 383 0.07 0.26 0 1.00
Commissioner (Binary) 383 0.08 0.27 0 1.00
Commissioner (B) 383 0.06 0.24 0 1.00
Commissioner (R) 383 0.07 0.26 0 1.00
Time in Office 383 0.26 1.12 0 9.83
Pre-election Year (Binary) 383 0.26 0.44 0 1.00
Election Year (Binary) 383 0.27 0.45 0 1.00
Employment Agriculture (ln) 383 5.60 1.58 0.99 8.01
Number of EU Members 383 15.20 5.19 9.00 25.00
Unemployment Rate 383 8.28 3.65 0.70 21.30
Per Capita GDP (EU=100) 383 100.15 41.51 23.05 301.18
New Member State (Binary) 383 0.22 0.42 0 1.00
Voting Power Council (%) 383 7.24 4.67 0.90 17.86
Domestic EU support (%) 383 45.78 22.81 -30.00 86.00
Observations in sample from Table 2, column 4. N = number of observations,
Mean = arithmetic mean, SD = standard deviation, Min = minimum value,
Max = maximum value.
26 For the exact calculation of the power indices see Bräuninger & König (2005).
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our main estimation equation is
Yi,t = α+ βCi,t +X
′
i,tγ + ϑi + τt + i,t,
where Yi,t is the budget share country i gets in year t, α is a constant, Ci,t is the variable for
appointing the Commissioner for Agriculture, Xi,t represents the vector of control variables,
ϑi are fixed-effects for country i, τt indicate time dummies and i,t is an error term.
As mentioned above, we follow Schneider (2013) in the choice of control variables. We differ in
some aspects from her specification, however. First, we add year dummies δt that account for
unobservable year-specific variation that might bias the estimate of Ci,t. Second, Schneider
(2013) uses panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to allow for panel-heteroscedasticity and
contemporaneously cross-sectionally correlated errors (Hoechle, 2007) and the Prais-Winsten
estimator to allow for panel-specific first-order auto-correlation. The Feasible Generalized
Least Squares (FGLS) approach of PCSE offers potential efficiency gains, as it assumes only
first-order auto-correlation of error terms within clusters. Though, it rests on the assumption
of correct specification of the error term structure and can be biased in the presence of cluster-
specific fixed-effects.27
The fixed effects (FE) within estimator with cluster-robust standard errors provides a more
conservative estimation that is less sensitive to misspecification. In cases of relatively small
cluster sizes, it is appropriate to use the within estimator standard errors for inference (see
Dube and Lindo in Cameron & Miller, 2015). Our estimates are robust to using PCSE, as we
will demonstrate below, but we prefer the more conservative fixed-effects within estimator.
We use two-way clustering where we cluster at the country and year level (Cameron et al.,
2011). Because the dependent variable is a share out of all member states, there necessarily
exists correlation across observations at each point in time, which makes it important to
cluster on years as well. To estimate our regressions, we make use of the procedure developed
by Baum et al. (2002).
27 This happens because the standard errors of the fixed-effects are not consistently estimated. This would not
be problematic in settings where we are not specifically interested in the fixed-effects and their significance




Table 2 shows the main results for the 1979-2006 period. For reasons of transparency and
comparability, the specification in column 1 uses PCSE as in Schneider (2013), and adds
our Commissioner variable. The coefficient for Commissioner is positive and significant at
the 1%-level, and remains nearly unchanged when adding year fixed-effects in column 2. In
column 3, we replicate column 2, but use the more robust FE within estimator with standard
errors clustered at the country and year level. The coefficient for Commissioner is 0.924 and
is significant at the 1%-level. Having the EU Commissioner for Agriculture is thus associated
with an increase in the share of the overall EU budget obtained by the respective country
of approximately 1%. This average percentage change would translate to 850 million EUR
based on the 2006 EU budget.
However, using general year dummies and country fixed-effects might not capture all un-
observed variation over time. In their analysis of labor market regulation on manufactur-
ing performance in Indian states, Besley & Burgess (2002) show that their main findings
disappear after controlling for cluster-specific time trends. To resolve this matter, we add
country-specific time trends in addition to the year dummies to account for changes in the
share of agricultural funds within a country over the sample period. If sectoral changes in
the industrial structure of individual countries lead to less money being allocated to these
countries, this could bias our results if it coincides with providing the EU Commissioner.28
In fact, adding the trends leads to a decrease in the coefficient to 0.553 in column 5. The
estimate becomes more precise, however, and the standard error decreases, which leads again
to a rejection of the null-hypothesis of no relationship at the 1%-level. Hence, in this most
conservative specification, providing the Commissioner for Agriculture is still related to about
0.5% higher fund shares. This is our preferred estimation, which we use for most further tests.
Recently, MacKinnon & Webb (2014) suggested that inference, i.e., estimating the correct
significance level of coefficients, might be affected by wildly different cluster sizes. Cluster
sizes hereby refer to the number of observations included in each cluster. In our sample, the
countries are contained with different numbers of years due to differences in their respective
timing of EU access. We programmed a wild cluster bootstrap procedure based on the sug-
gestions in the appendix of MacKinnon & Webb (2014), Cameron et al. (2008), and Cameron
& Miller (2015). The program relies on a cluster bootstrap with asymptotic refinement, which
is achieved by bootstrapping the pivotal Wald t-statistic. The Wald statistic is pivotal as it
does not depend on any unknown parameters in V [|X].
28 This is comparable to relaxing the common trend assumption in a difference-in-difference setting. The main








Table 2: Regression Results
Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Overall Regional/Social
Dependent Variable Fund Share Fund Share Fund Share Fund Share Fund Share Funds Share Funds Share
Commissioner 0.428∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ - -
[0.095] [0.105] [0.291] [0.149] [0.149]
Commissioner (B) - - - - - −0.070 -
[0.746]
Commissioner (R) - - - - - - 0.102
[0.122]
Pre-election Year (Binary) 0.108∗∗ 0.074 0.075 0.059 0.059 0.051 0.075∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.047] [0.096] [0.089] [0.089] [0.128] [0.010]
Election Year (Binary) 0.060 0.034 −0.001 0.054 0.054 0.036 0.009
[0.044] [0.046] [0.116] [0.112] [0.112] [0.111] [0.015]
Employment Agriculture (ln) 1.197∗∗∗ 0.135 −0.835 −0.120 −0.120 −0.103 −0.764∗∗
[0.171] [0.371] [1.065] [0.465] [0.465] [1.042] [0.357]
Per Capita GDP (EU=100) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.018∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.006
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.010] [0.010] [0.025] [0.005]
Unemployment Rate −0.057∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.018 0.031 0.031 0.184∗ 0.053∗
[0.014] [0.014] [0.056] [0.033] [0.033] [0.098] [0.029]
Voting Power Council (%) 0.581∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ −0.002
[0.024] [0.043] [0.128] [0.107] [0.107] [0.207] [0.063]
Domestic EU Support (%) 0.000 0.004 0.008 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.001
[0.002] [0.003] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.004]
New Member State (Binary) −0.991∗∗∗ −1.284∗∗∗ −1.947∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗ −0.545∗∗ −0.823 −0.576∗
[0.169] [0.207] [0.372] [0.242] [0.242] [0.549] [0.344]
Number of EU Members −0.029∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.054 −0.054 0.056 −0.028
[0.017] [0.240] [0.055] [0.042] [0.042] [0.280] [0.028]
Estimated Model PCSE PCSE FE FE FE FE FE
Year Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific Time Trend no no no yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.88 0.92 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.57 0.59
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 401 383
Bootstrap p-value (2-point) 0.019
Bootstrap p-value (6-point) 0.018
The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. PCSE refers to FGLS estimation with panel-corrected standard errors to allow comparison with
Schneider (2013). FE refers to the more robust fixed-effects within estimator. Standard errors with FE are multiway-clustered and allow for arbitrary correlation at the
country and year level using the ivreg2 command in Stata. The sample runs from 1979-2006 in all regressions. Bootstrap p-value refers to wild cluster bootstrap as
described in the text. ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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To generate the bootstrap dependent variables we used the “Rademacher”-2-point distribution
as well as the “Webb”-6-point distribution (Webb, 2013).
The results with 10,000 repetitions can be seen in column 5. The p-value with the Rademacher-
distribution is 0.019, i.e., still corresponds to significance at the 5%-level. With the 6-point
distribution, which, as Webb (2013) argues, further improves the reliability of statistical
inference, the p-value becomes 0.018. Hence, we conclude that our baseline estimates of
the relationship between providing the EU Commissioner for Agriculture and the respective
country of origin is robustly positive and significant. It is also economically significant. The
coefficient of 0.553 would translate into about 510 million EUR higher allocations per year.
This is a significant amount, particularly for smaller member states. For example, Denmark’s
overall EU receipts sum up to 1,455 million EUR.
Other Commissioner positions might be used to redirect funds to their respective home coun-
tries as well. As argued above, the other obvious candidates where such a relationship could
be measured are the position of Budget Commissioner and Commissioner for Regional Policy.
Yet, these relationships are less well-suited for a quantitative assessment than the Agricul-
tural Commissioner as outlined above. We use our variables for Commissioner (B) and
Commissioner (R) to test for a relationship with the overall budget share and the regional
and social fund’s share of the respective country of origin. As expected, we find no significant
relationship. Commissioner (B) relates to a coefficient of -0.070 and Commissioner (R) to
0.102, and both are far from conventional significance levels. The most likely explanation
is that either there is not enough leeway associated with these positions, the multi-annual
financial framework restricts their room for maneuver, or there is too much noise in the data
to be able to identify a significant relationship.
With regard to the Agricultural Commissioner, it seems possible that the effectiveness of the
Commissioners in redirecting funds to their home country is enhanced with the time they
stay in office. In practice, huge differences exist between Commissioners in terms of the
degree of power they develop in office. Smith (2003) identifies several crucial factors, among
them the personal network, or learning to use a one’s latent power effectively. Suvarierol
(2008) highlights that international contacts in Brussels are especially potent in this regard.
Our hypothesis based on this is that the Commissioners’ personal networks (both within and
outside of the EC) improves with their time in office. This could improve their ability to push
national interests through.
Table 3 shows the test of this hypothesis. First, column 2 demonstrates that our main results
remain qualitatively unchanged when using a binary variable instead of the monthly shares of
the year that the respective country provided the Commissioner. This binary variable allows
for a more straightforward interpretation of the interactions with time in office.
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Table 3: Regression Results
Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural
Dependent Variable Fund Share Fund Share Fund Share
Commissioner 0.553∗∗∗ - -
[0.149]
Commissioner (Binary) - 0.496∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗
[0.126] [0.143]
Commissioner (Binary) - - 0.065
× Time in Office [0.075]
Controls yes yes yes
Observations 383 383 383
Adj. R-Squared 0.78 0.78 0.80
The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. All
columns use the fixed-effects within estimator. Standard errors are multiway-
clustered and allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level using
the ivreg2 command in Stata. ‘Controls’ includes all control variables in Table 2,
column 5. This includes country and year fixed-effects, plus country-specific time
trends. ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
We can see in column 3 that the interaction is positive, as expected, with a value of 0.065,
but insignificant at conventional levels. Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of Commissioner
conditional on time in office for 1 to 4 years in office, and the 99%-confidence intervals. The
reason for restricting the periods to 4 years is that in all except one case, the Commissioners
remain in office for 4 years or less.
Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Commissioner Conditional on Time in Office
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While the use of country fixed-effects, year dummies and country-specific time trends should
alleviate some concerns about endogeneity and selection bias, non-linear country-specific
trends could still bias our estimations. If we use the binary variable for Commissioner we can
compare our specification to a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation where Commissioner
is our treatment and all other countries are the respective control group. In a DiD-setting, we
would be concerned about the causal interpretation of our coefficient if there would be different
pre- or post-treatment trends between the respective treated and untreated countries. Includ-
ing lead-variables allows us to inspect pre-treatment trends; including lag-variables allows an
assessment of variances in the post-treatment effect.
In this case, our theoretical considerations suggest that the Commissioners are able to affect
budget allocation in favor of their home country only once they are in office. A positive and
significant lead-variable would thus cast doubts on the causal interpretation of our earlier
results as it would indicate different trends between treated and untreated countries. Sig-
nificant lags are theoretically possible and not implausible; the Commissioners could either
install staff that support their cause even after their dismissal or change internal processes or
rules which take some time to reverse. Additionally even once agreed upon, implementing a
policy change usually takes some time.
Table 4: Pre- and Post-Treatment Trends
Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural
Dependent Variable Fund Share Fund Share Fund Share
Commissioner (t-2) −0.050 - 0.053
[0.243] [0.194]
Commissioner (t-1) −0.040 - 0.040
[0.378] [0.320]
Commissioner 0.545∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
[0.149] [0.225] [0.218]
Commissioner (t+1) - 0.732 0.740
[0.613] [0.611]
Commissioner (t+2) - 0.477 0.484
[0.355] [0.347]
Commissioner (t+3) - 0.039 0.048
[0.198] [0.177]
Commissioner (t+4) - 0.093 0.099
[0.159] [0.127]
Controls yes yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.78 0.78 0.78
Observations 383 383 383
The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. All
columns use the fixed-effects within estimator. Standard errors are multiway-
clustered and allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level using
the ivreg2 command in Stata. ‘Controls’ includes all control variables in Table 2,
column 5. This includes country and year fixed effects, plus country-specific
time trends. ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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We thus code two lead-variables, which take the value 1 only in the year (t−1) and two years
(t − 2) before a country provides the Commissioner, and 0 otherwise. For post-trends, we
code 4 lag-variables that take the value 1 from one year after dismissal (t + 1) to four years
after dismissal (t+ 4), and 0 otherwise.29
Table 4 depicts the results including different leads and lags. The specification is otherwise
identical to our preferred specification above and includes the same controls. We estimate




i,tγ + ϑi + τt + i,t with the binary indicator used
for Ci,t and with Xi,t including linear country-specific time trends (cf. the setting in Autor,
2003). In column 1 it can be seen that both added lead-variables remain insignificant, whereas
the coefficient for Commissioner (t) increases marginally to 0.545 and remains significant
at the 1%-level. Column 2 adds lags instead of leads. Again, all the lag-variables are far
from conventional significance levels, while Commissioner (t) increases to 0.692 and remains
significant at the 1%-level. Finally, column 3 adds all leads and lags. Commissioner (t)
increases further to 0.704 and remains significant at the 1%-level. All leads and lags are
insignificant, giving no indication of pre- and post-treatment trends, while Commissioner (t)
remains significant throughout.
Figure 5: Leads and Lags
Regression coefficients and confidence intervals based on Table 4, column 3. Red
squares indicate the coefficient and the grey-shaded area the 95%-confidence interval
with twoway-clustered standard errors.
29 We assign the 1 only for those cases where the country really stopped providing the Commissioner in (t+1),
i.e., where we can identify post-treatment trends. We exclude the second to fourth year in office, where
possibly the first to third lag could be coded as a 1. This would not capture a post-treatment effect,
however, and bias our results.
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Figure 5 illustrates this graphically. The red squares indicate the coefficient, and the grey-
shaded area the 95%-confidence interval. It can be easily seen from the confidence-band
that all leads and lags are far from being significantly different from 0. The graph shows
that the increase in fund shares occurs only during the time in office, remains positive but
indistinguishable from 0 in the two years directly after the appointment of a new Commissioner
from a different member state, and reverts back to 0 in (t + 3). This is a crucial result for
the causal interpretation of the identified relationship, as differences in trends were our most
serious concern. The next part will present further sensitivity tests and an assessment of the
robustness of the coefficient to selection-on-unobservables.
4.2 Sensitivity Tests and Identification of Causal Effects
So far, we have demonstrated that the positive relationship between Commissioner and
Agricultural Fund Share is robust to employing panel-corrected standard errors and fixed-
effects within estimation. Adding year dummies and country-specific time trends to alleviate
concerns about common trends further strengthens this conclusion. The significance of the
coefficient is robust to twoway-clustering as well as using a wild cluster bootstrap to take
the unbalanced panel into account. Furthermore, we showed that there are no pre- and
post-treatment effects using leads and lags, which can also be understood as a placebo check.
One concern with our identification strategy could be the relatively low number of Commis-
sioners, i.e., the fact that the treatment is relatively rare. Theoretically, an individual country
could thus have a strong influence on the estimated coefficients. There exist various methods
to identify potential outliers and observations with greater influence, which all involve some
arbitrary choices. To avoid relying on these assumptions, we decide to re-run our preferred
specification (Table 2, colum 4) n times, leaving out each of the n countries in the sample
once. This way, we can determine whether the coefficient and significance level is due to any
individual country in the sample.
Table 5 shows that this does not seem to be the case. The left column indicates which
country was left out of the estimations, which, depending on the time of EU access, leads to
different numbers of observations. We can see that the coefficient takes on values between
0.414 (omitting the Netherlands) and 0.689 (omitting Ireland), but remains significant at the
1%-level in all cases. Hence, the relative rareness of the treatment is not a serious problem
for identification. In addition, a sample without larger countries should exhibit a smaller
selection bias as it excludes some countries that have a lower likelihood of being interested in
the Agricultural Commissioner post. When omitting the largest countries with more than 40
million inhabitants, the relationship remains stable and significant at the 5%-level.
As we argue, selection among the smaller states seems to be largely random and unpredictable.
To further remedy concerns about selection-on-unobservables that could bias our results up-
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Table 5: Robustness to Outliers and Selection Effects
Omitted Omitted
Country Comm. Obs. Country Comm. Obs.
Belgium 0.554∗∗∗ 355 Sweden 0.561∗∗∗ 371
[0.146] [0.150]
Denmark 0.561∗∗∗ 355 United Kingdom 0.530∗∗∗ 356
[0.212] [0.159]
Germany 0.557∗∗∗ 355 Cyprus 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.164] [0.149]
Greece 0.530∗∗∗ 358 Malta 0.554∗∗∗ 380
[0.135] [0.149]
Spain 0.544∗∗∗ 362 Czech Republic 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.135] [0.149]
France 0.579∗∗∗ 355 Poland 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.203] [0.148]
Ireland 0.689∗∗∗ 356 Slovenia 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.197] [0.149]
Italy 0.496∗∗∗ 355 Slovakia 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.144] [0.149]
Luxembourg 0.593∗∗∗ 355 Hungary 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.170] [0.149]
Netherlands 0.414∗∗∗ 355 Estonia 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.104] [0.149]
Autria 0.547∗∗∗ 371 Latvia 0.557∗∗∗ 380
[0.154] [0.149]
Portugal 0.568∗∗∗ 362 Lithunia 0.553∗∗∗ 380
[0.139] [0.149]
Finland 0.557∗∗∗ 371 Large Countries 0.451∗∗ 251
[0.151] [0.211]
The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. All columns
use the fixed-effects within estimator. Standard errors are multiway-clustered and
allow for arbitrary correlation at the country and year level using the ivreg2 command
in Stata. They include all control variables from Table 2, column 5. This includes
country and year fixed-effects, plus country-specific time trends. Large Countries
include Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain. ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
or downwards, we further approach potential selection issues by using so-called endogenous
binary variable models (treatment effect models). There is no convincing instrument for ac-
quiring a specific Commissioner that is excludable to our dependent variable. Instead, the
approach of these “Heckit-models” is similar to Heckman selection models: The selection prob-
lem is solved by explicitly modeling selection instead of only proposing a supposedly exogenous
instrument. Treatment effect regression differs from sample selection models as the binary
treatment variable is directly entered in the regression equation and the outcome variable is
observed for both the treated and the untreated subjects. The advantage of this potential
outcome model is that it provides information about the effects of non-linear selection-bias.
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Specifically, we model two equations. Our simplified regression equation is Yi,t = α+ βCi,t +
X
′
i,tγ+ϑi+ τt+ i,t, where Xi,t contains the controls and country-specific time trends and Ci,t
is the binary treatment indicator. Our probit selection-equation estimates the latent variable
C∗i,t = Z
′
i,tψ + ui,t with
Ci,t =
{
1 if C∗i,t > 0,
0 if C∗i,t ≤ 0
}
and Prob(Ci,t = 1 | Zi,t) = ∅(Z ′i,tψ), respectively,
Prob(Ci,t = 0 | Zi,t) = 1 − ∅(Z ′i,tψ). Zi,t is a vector of variables determining the selection






, ρ 6= 0 reflects the assumed endogeneity of the treatment, and σ2u = 1 for
identification.
This is a switching regression depending on whether C∗ > 0 or C∗ < 0, with separate




i,tγ + i,t) or non-treatment
(Yi,t = X
′
i,tγ + i,t) regime. For a more detailed description see for example Cameron &
Trivedi (2005, sec. 16.7 and 25.3.4) and Maddala (1983). We conduct the estimation using
full maximum likelihood under a normal distribution assumption.30
We do not claim that this approach resolves all potential selection-bias concerns, as it relies on
assumptions about the correlation structure. Rather, we regard it as a further useful robust-
ness check to assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in the econometric specification
and the direction of selection-bias. λ is the inverse Mills-ratio or non-selection hazard, and the
parameter ρ indicates the correlation between the error terms εi.t and ui,t. We test the model
assumption with a likelihood ratio test of an independent probit and regression model versus
the treatment-effect likelihood, a test of ρ = 0 that is χ2 distributed. The Wald test-statistic
rejects that ρ equals zero with a p-value of 0.004.
The left part of Table 6 shows the results from the probit estimation of the likelihood to
provide the EU Commissioner for Agriculture for a certain year and country. We do not
put too much weight on this equation, as it allows no clear causal interpretation, but give
a brief summary. Factors significantly positively related to providing this Commissioner are
Pre-election Year (Binary) and Election Year (Binary), Unemployment Rate, Domestic EU
Support (%), and being a New Member State (Binary).31 Voting Power Council (%) is nega-
tively related to Commissioner. Most interestingly for us is that Employment Agriculture (ln),
i.e., a proxy for the importance of agriculture in the respective country, is not significantly
30 Alternatively we can regard this model as a non-standard maximum-likelihood estimator. The likelihood
function LN (Θ) = f(y,X|Θ) = f(y|X,Θ)f(x|Θ) would generally require specifying the conditional density
of Y given X as well as the marginal density of X. It is standard to use only the conditional density f(y|X,Θ),
and ignore f(X|Θ). This in essence assumes exogenous sampling and conditional independence. Treatment
effect models drop this assumption, but instead assume a specific correlation structure of the error terms
of the two equations to be estimated.
31 The Number of EU Members is also positively related but has no meaningful interpretation here.
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Table 6: Endogenous Selection Model
Selection Equation Treatment Equation
Dependent Variable Commissioner (Binary) Agricultural Fund Share
Pre-election Year (Binary) 1.994∗∗∗ [0.350] 0.024 [0.101]
Election Year (Binary) 1.138∗∗∗ [0.270] 0.038 [0.103]
Employment Agriculture (ln) 1.100 [1.135] −0.020 [0.493]
Per Capita GDP (EU=100) 0.020 [0.013] 0.016∗ [0.009]
Unemployment Rate 0.326∗∗∗ [0.123] 0.007 [0.031]
Voting Power Council (%) −1.775∗∗∗ [0.601] 0.344∗∗∗ [0.108]
Domestic EU Support (%) 0.069∗∗ [0.034] −0.014 [0.010]
New Member State (Binary) 13.366∗∗∗ [1.810] −0.684∗∗∗ [0.234]
Number of EU Members 2.059∗∗∗ [0.512] −0.053 [0.044]
Commissioner (Binary) - 1.334∗∗∗ [0.352]
Number of Cases 383 Rho −0.880
Lamda −0.610 Prob > chi2(Rho=0) 0.004
The table displays regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. The model defines a treated
and untreated group based on Commissioner (Binary). Selection variables include all control variables
in Table 2, column 5. ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
related to providing the Commissioner. Turning to the second-stage regression on Agricultural
Fund Share in the right half of Table 6, the coefficient for Commissioner becomes larger at
1.334 and remains significant at the 1%-level. Hence, taking selection into account with a full
maximum-likelihood suggests that if there was selection bias before, it seems to have biased
Commissioner downwards rather than upwards. The larger effect would amount to about
1,229 million EUR per year (based on the 2006 EU budget).
While this prior approach has used selection-on-observables for identification, selection-on-
unobservables could still bias our results due to the not-strictly-random nature of our treat-
ment. Thus, we finally want to demonstrate how likely it is, if our attempts so far would have
failed to identify a causal effect, that our results are explained by selection-on-unobservables.
We apply the methods developed in Altonji et al. (2005) to assess how much larger selection-
bias based on unobserved factors would have to be compared to observed factors to fully
explain our results.
The strategy is to use selection-on-observables to assess the severity of potential selection bias
for the results. We compare two kinds of regressions: one with a limited set of controls (L
= limited) to one with a full set of controls (F = full). Comparable to Nunn & Wantchekon
(2011) we use two different sets for L and F. L1 contains country-fixed-effects and year
dummies, L2 contains only country-fixed-effects. F1 comprises all variables from Table 2,
column 3, and F2 adds the country-specific linear time trends to the former, i.e. responds to
our most restrictive specification. We then calculate a “Selection ratio” (SR), which is the
necessary ratio of selection-on-unobservables to observables to fully explain our coefficients as
| βˆF /(βˆF − βˆL) |. The denominator, i.e., the difference between the βˆ coefficients indicates
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the degree to which our estimate is affected by selection-on-observables. A small difference
indicates little selection effects. βˆL in the nominator enters positively in the ratio, as we
need stronger selection-on-unobservables to explain a larger coefficient. Altonji et al. (2005)
provide the underlying assumptions and Bellows & Miguel (2008) a formal derivation.
We have applied the relevant control variables as identified in Schneider (2013), without
arbitrarily ‘picking’ our own set of control variables. These observed factors explain a large
share of the variation in the dependent variable. So how likely is a bias due to unobserved
time-variant factors captured neither by the controls nor the country-specific time trends?
The resulting ratios indicate that for {L1,F1}, selection-on-unobservables would have to be
1.9 times as large as selection-on-observables to fully explain the positive relationship of the
fund’s share with Commissioner for Agriculture. The respective ratios increase to nearly 5
times for the {L1,F2} and {L2,F1} combinations. The smallest ratio is found when comparing
{L2,F2}, but is still above one.
Table 7: Sensitivity to Selection-on-Unobservables
Controls in the Controls in the SR = Identified
Limited Set Full Set βL βF | βF /(βL − βF )| β-Set
L1: Country-FE, F1: Country-FE, 0.43 0.92 1.88 [0.92; 1.52]
Year-FE Year-FE,
Control Variables




L2: Country-FE F1: Country-FE, 1.10 0.92 5.36 [0.85; 0.92]
Year-FE,
Control Variables,




The table reports regression coefficients on Commissioner and selection ratios (SR) based on the
formula depicted. Control variables include all controls from prior regressions. A detailed defintion of
the identified set is provided in the main text. The set is well identified if it does not include 0.
Oster (2013) provides an important formal extension of the intuition above. Due to space
restrictions, we outline only the intuition and refer the reader to the paper for details. Again,
we examine the change from βˆL to βˆF . As outlined above, we are less concerned by selection-
on-unobservables if the coefficient moves away from 0 or shows only small changes towards
0 when adding observables. However, Oster (2013) shows that small changes in the coeffi-
cient only help in coming closer to a causal interpretation if the added variables also explain
additional variation in the dependent variable.
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We need assumptions about the bounding value for Rmax, the maximum share of the variance
that can be systematically explained, and δ, the relation of selection-on-unobservables to
observables. She argues that Rmax ∈ [RF , 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1] are plausible boundaries. For
simplicity, we use the most conservative setting with Rmax = 1 and δ = 1. We then calculate
the boundary of the set β∗ = βF − δ × (βL−βF )×(Rmax−RF )(RF−RL) and the identified set ∆s =
[βF , β∗]∀βF ≤ β∗ ∧∆s = [β∗, βF ]∀βF > β∗.
Oster (2013) suggests that to assess a causal interpretation of the coefficient estimate one
should, for those cases where conditioning on observables moves β towards 0, examine whether
the set includes 0, and whether its boundaries are within the confidence-interval of βF . Table
7 shows that our identified set for the two cases where observables move us closer to 0 are
[0.44; 0.55] and [0.85; 0.92]; far from including 0. This is strong evidence that even with the
most conservative choice of the suggested boundaries our full set is precisely estimated within
the confidence intervals and does not include zero. Overall, we find no plausible explanation
that holds as an argument against a causal interpretation of the identified relationship.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study was to examine whether and to what extent national background
continues to matter in the context of international organizations. This is particularly relevant
for the European Union, which is in a continuous struggle between two opposing ideals.
Proponents of more intense cooperation want to establish a European state with strong central
political authorities, while others pledge for a confederation of largely independent states in a
federal system due to heterogeneous preferences and common pool problems.32 Against this
background, examining the degree to which decisions of European Union actors are shaped
by their respective national background is an important research question. Our focus is the
European Commission as the main executive organ of the EU.
For most Commissioners, it is hard to trace and quantify their decisions, partly due to the
nature of their task or the absence of the necessary data. The Agricultural Commissioners
are an exception and seem to be the most appropriate candidates as they fulfill all necessary
requirements to identify a potential relationship. First, their roles actually give them enough
influence to be able to shift decisions in favor of their home countries. Second, the agricultural
budget was and still is the main budgetary item in the overall EU budget, thus making the
relationships under examination economically relevant. Third, we were able to calculate the
share of the budget that each member state receives for a sufficiently long time period by
using encoded EU budget lists and documents over the 1979-2006 period.
32 Schneider (2014) argues that preference heterogeneity, bargaining dynamics, and the ability to find com-
promises for deeper cooperation on the EU level particularly depend on current domestic politics of the EU
members and the number of member states. Preference heterogeneity seems to present the larger obstacle
to cooperation, but adding new members does not in all circumstances amplify the problem.
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Our findings indicate that providing the Commissioner for Agriculture is related to increases
of about one percentage point in the share of the overall EU budget that the country of
origin receives. This relation is significant at the 1%-level, even in the most conservative
specification. While we argue that providing the Commissioner is largely exogenous, the
positive relation is also robust to including country fixed-effects, time fixed-effects, country-
specific time trends and using a wild cluster bootstrap-procedure. Thus, it can be explained
neither by unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors nor by different linear trends
between treated and untreated countries.
We think a causal interpretation of this positive relationship is justified. We test a series
of alternative explanations like pre- or post-trend differences, omitting each member state
individually and all large countries jointly, or endogenous selection, and find no plausible
alternative reason. We also demonstrate that even if there would be alternative explanations
based on unobserved factors, these would have to be implausibly high to fully explain the
detected relationship. Thus, we cannot reject the assumption that there is a causal effect of
providing the EU Commissioner for Agriculture on higher budget receipts.
This finding cannot necessarily be extrapolated to all other Commissioners and political actors
in the EU. Still, this is clear and quantitatively relevant evidence that national background
continues to matter in the EU. The evidence we provide is for a case where the respective
actor has the means to influence decisions and where we could identify a clear link to a
precisely measurable outcome variable. Even if scientific caution guides us to avoid premature
conclusions, finding a significant relationship here should change our a priori assumptions
about whether these problems also exist in other cases, where a lack of data and transparency
does not allow us to detect them. Future research should aim to further confirm whether
similar relationships exist in the EU and other international organizations.
This should by no means be interpreted and used as evidence against the further development
of the EU, which we consider one of the most impressive and important political and economic
projects in the realm of international cooperation of the last half-century. Instead, we hope to
bring awareness to the need to modify and adapt the political structures and the relationship
between member states and central authorities which is among the most pressing issues in
the EU. Unfortunately, it does not receive the widespread public attention it deserves.
However, the further development of the European Union should not repeat mistakes of the
past and ignore economic and social realities for the sake of avoiding political controversies and
difficult but necessary debates. One important direct policy implication is to take a realistic
and cautious approach to international integration. There is now an impressive amount of
evidence that the national or regional background of politicians and bureaucratic actors still
shapes their decision-making when working at an international level. This should be taken
into account by designing mechanisms that minimize common pool problems and the ability
of individual actors and countries to over-proportionally exert their influence. Moreover, only
more transparency about voting patterns and internal decisions can enable the public, media
and science to provide the checks and balances necessary in a democratic system.
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Table 1: List of Agricultural Commissioners
Name Nation from to
Finn Olav Gundelach1) Denmark January 6, 1977 January 13, 1981
Poul Dalsager2) Denmark January 20, 1981 January 6, 1985
Frans Andriessen3) Netherlands January 7, 1985 January 5, 1989
Ray MacSharry4) Ireland January 6, 1989 January 5, 1993
René Steichen5) Luxembourg January 6, 1993 January 24, 1995
Franz Fischler6) Austria January 25, 1995 November 21, 2004
Sandra Kalniete7) Latvia May 1, 2004 November 21, 2004
Mariann Fischer Boel8) Denmark November 22, 2004 February 9, 2009






























Table 2: List of Regional Commissioners
Name Nation from to
Antonio Giolitti1) Italy January 6, 1977 January 6, 1985
Grigoris Varfis2) Greece January 7, 1985 December 31, 1985
Alois Pfeiffer3) Germany January 1, 1986 August 1, 1987
Peter Schmidhuber4) Germany September 22, 1987 January 5, 1989
Bruce Millan5) United Kingdom January 6, 1989 January 24, 1995
Monika Wulf-Mathies6) Germany January 25, 1995 September 17, 1999
Michel Barnier7) France September 17, 1999 April 1, 2004
Jacques Barrot8) France April 26, 2004 November 21, 2004
Péter Balázs9) Hungary May 1, 2004 November 21, 2004
Danuta Hübner10) Poland November 22, 2004 July 4, 2009



























Table 3: List of Budget Commissioners
Name Nation from to
Christopher Tugendhat1) United Kingdom January 6, 1977 January 6, 1985
Henning Christophersen2) Denmark January 7, 1985 January 5, 1989
Peter Schmidhuber3) Germany January 6, 1989 January 24, 1995
Erkki Liikanen4) Finland January 25, 1995 September 17, 1999
Michaele Schreyer5) Germany September 17, 1999 November 22, 2004
Marcos Kyprianou6) Cyprus May 1, 2004 November 22, 2004
Dalia Grybauskaite7) Lithunia November 22, 2004 July 1, 2009





















EC collectively resigned on March 15, 1999 and remained in office executively until September 1999. All
weblinks last accessed on May 1, 2015.
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6.2 Appendix B
Description of Variables used:
Agricultural Fund Share1) Each member state’s annual agricultural fund (EAGGF) re-
ceipts as a share of the overall annual EU budget (in %).
Overall Funds Share1) Each member state’s annual budget receipts as a share of
the overall annual EU budget (in %).
Regional/Social Funds Share1) Each member state’s regional and social fund (ERDF/ESF)
receipts as a share of the overall annual EU budget (in %).
Commissioner Proportion of the year in which a country appointed the
Agricultural Commissioner (0 if country i did not appoint
the Agricultural Commissioner in year t, 1 if the country
appointed the Agricultural Commissioner during the whole
year). A month is counted, if the respective Commissioner
was in office for the major part of this month.
Commissioner (Binary) Dummy for appointing the Agricultural Commissioner (1 if
country i appoint the Agricultural Commissioner in in year t
and if Commissioner is not 0, 0 otherwise).
Commissioner (B) Proportion of the year in which a country appointed the
Budget Commissioner (0 if country i did not appoint the
Budget Commissioner in year t, 1 if the country appointed
the Budget Commissioner during the whole year). A month
is counted, if the respective Commissioner was in office for
the major part of this month.
Commissioner (R) Proportion of the year in which a country appointed the Re-
gional Commissioner (0 if country i did not appoint the Re-
gional Commissioner in year t, 1 if the country appointed the
Regional Commissioner during the whole year). A month
is counted, if the respective Commissioner was in office for
the major part of this month.
Time in Office Cumulated years in office as Agricultural Commissioner (1
in the first year, 2 in the second year,...).
Commissioner (Binary)
× Time in Office
Interaction of Commissioner (Binary) and Time in Office.
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Description of Variables used (continued):
Election Year (Binary) Dummy for election years (1 in years with a national election
in country i, 0 otherwise).
Preelection Year (Binary) Dummy for preelection years (1 in the year before the na-
tional election in country i, 0 otherwise).
Employment Agriculture (ln)2) Logarithmized number (in millions) of employees in the agri-
cultural sector.
Number of EU Members Number of EU Member States.
Unemployment Rate2) Unemployment Rate (in %).
Per Capita GDP (EU=100)2) Normalized per capita gross domestic product (EU average
= 100).
New Member State (Binary) Dummy for the newest member states (1 for all new mem-
bers until the next enlargement, 0 otherwise).
Voting Power Council (%)3) Shapley-Shubik index of country i in the Council in year t
(in %).
Domestic EU Support (%)4) The percentage of citizens who think that “EC/EU mem-
bership is a good thing” minus the percentage of those who
think that “EC/EU membership is a bad thing.”
Original Sources:
1) All budget data are from the annual reports of the European Court of Auditors.
2) Eurostat
3) Data from Indices of Power IOP 2.0. Available at http://www.tbraeuninger.de/download/
4) Eurobarometer
All remaining variables are adapted from Schneider (2013).
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6.3 Appendix C
Table 4: EU Accession
Year New Member States ∑
1957 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 6
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 9
1981 Greece 10
1986 Portugal, Spain 12
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden 15
2004 Estonia, Latvia, Lithunia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 25
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus
2007 Bulgaria, Romania 27
2012 Croatia 28
The Table lists the enlargement rounds of the EU. Column 3 shows the cumulative
number of member states after the respective enlargement.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/factsheet_en.pdf
